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S.: Easements--Location When Not Definitely Described

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

of the locus delicti would not thereby be adversely affected." The
protagonists of this liberal view contend that the reason for the
common law rule' ceases to exist where, as in the instant case', a
personal representative suing under a wrongful death statute acts
not as an ordinary administrator, but rather as a statutory trustee
for the beneficiaries, since here the proceeds of recovery could
7
never go to satisfy the creditors of the decedent.
Considering the West Virginia restrictive statute in thq light
of the liberal majority view, its result is, perhaps, undesirable. The
decision, however, is not only sound, but refreshing in that the
court recognized its proper sphere of authority by leaving any
remedial action in this regard to the proper forum, the legislature.
L. R. M.
EASMNTS -

LocAmoN Wnxm NOT DEnninrr=

DESrcIED.-

The grantor conveyed one-half acre of land, in the midst of his
farm, to P for burial purposes with a "convenient right of way"
and specified its distance between two fixed terminals, but he did
not definitely describe or locate its course. Later D acquired possession of the grantor's farm. P used a convenient course without
4
In fact, in actual practice, permission to sue has apparently become the
rule rather than the exception. Popp v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry., 96 Fed. 465
(C. C. S. D. Ohio 1899) (construing Ohio statutes); Provost v. International
Giant Safety Coaster Co., 152 App. Div. 83, 136 N. Y. S. 654 (1912); Florida
C. & P. By. v. Sullivan, 120 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903) (construing lorida
statutes); St. Louis Southwestern Ry.v. Graham, 83 Ark. 61, 102 S. W. 700

(1907).
The common law rule is founded on the policy of the courts of each state
to protect resident creditors of the decedent against the withdrawal into another
state of assets upon which they may rely for payment. Ghilain v. Couture,
84 N. H. 48, 146 Atl. 395, 65 A. L. R. 553 (1929) ; Connor v. New York, N. H.
& H. Ry., 28 R. I. 560, 68 AtI. 481 (1908).
e This was an action brought under the West Virginia wrongful death statute
providing for an action by the personal representative of the deceased, and
that the proceeds of recovery are to be distributed to the decedent's beneficiaries in the manner and proportion prescribed for the distribution of the
personal estate of one dying intestate. W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 55, art.

7 §§ 5, 6.
7"The reason that the rule in question [that an administrator may only
sue in the state of his appointment] cannot possibly apply here is that, by the
express terms of the West Virginia wrongful death statute, no creditor of the
decedent as such has the slightest interest in or right to the recovery sought
by the plaintiff at bar. The foreign administrator here sues to recover a fund
which is not to be administered, but is merely to be distributed. When a reason for a rule fails, the rule ceases to apply." Pearson v. Norfolk & W. By.,
286 Fed. 429 (D. C. Va. 1923) (construing West Virginia statutes); Connor
v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry., 28 R. I. 560, 68 Atl. 481 (1908); Boulden v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 205 Pa. 264, 54 AtI. 906 (1903); Kansas Pacific Ry. V.
Cutter, 16 Kan. 568 (1876).
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objection from the grantor or D. D contested this location, and P
filed a bill in equity to protect it. Held, that the practical use of a
particular way and acquiescence by the parties had fixed the location, and that it is within the discretion of the chancellor to fix the
width of the way where none had been specified. Rhodes Cemetemj
Ass'n v. Miller.'
When the grant or reservation has not precisely located the
easement, there are several instances where it is located by acts of
the parties. 2 One of the more common is where the servient owner
locates the easement with due regard to the grantee's rights and
conveniences. 3 Should the grantor fail to exercise this right, the
grantee may make his own selection with due respect to the rights
and conveniences of the grantor.4 Further, the location of an ease.
ment may be determined by an agreement between the parties, and
such agreement need not be in writing' but may be inferred from
words or conduct.8 Once the location has been made, it is final and
binding7 and cannot be changed without the mutual assent of the
parties.
If the location has not been determined by any of the above
methods, it is generally held that a court of equity has jurisdiction
to select. it.' If the right to such easement exists, equity should
1 7 S. E. (2d) 659 (W. Va. 1940).
2
Runill v. Robbins, 77 Me. 193 (1885); Winslow v. Vallejo, 148 Cal. 723,
84 Pac. 191 (1906). This problem only arises where there is no mention of the
location of the right of way.in the .reservation or grant of the easement or
where a way of necessity arises by operation of law, but it does not arise
where there is a way by prescription because in that case the location is ftixe
wholly by adverse user.
s Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 272 N. W. 270 '(1937); Tutwiler Coal,
Coke & Iron Co. v. Tuvin, 158 Ala. 657, 48 So. 79 (1908).
4 Ritchey v. Welsh, 149 Ind. 214, 48 N. E. 1031 (1898) ; Tutwiler Coal, Coke
& Iron Co. v. Tuvin, 158 Ala. 657, 48 So. 79 (1909).
5 Rumill v. Robbins, 77 Me. 193 (1885).
6 Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & P. R. Corp., 202 Mass. 585, 89
N. E. 118 (1909) ; Eureka Land Co. v. Watts, 119 Va. 506, 89 S. E. 968 (1916) ;
Ritchey v. Welsh, -149 Ind. 214, 48 N. E. 1031 (1898). It is well settled that
when there is no express agreement for location, the practical and reasonable
location acquiesced in by the grantor sufficiently locates the way, which Will
be deemed the one intended by the grant. Accord: Scott v. Black, 95 W. Va.
48, 120 S. E. 167 (1923). The location of the easement was changed and the
grantee went to great expense in doing so; the grantor merely stood by, and
the court held that the grantor was estopped to deny the new location.
Contra: Flner
7 Douglas v. Jordan, 232 Mich. 283, 205 N. W. 52 (1925).
v. Lawrence, 187 Ky. 384, 220 S. W. 1041 (1920), in relation to a prescriptive
right of way, "the county court, upon application and proper cause shown,
may change the right of way and locate it at another place, if the parties justify
it." The great weight of authority is otherwise.
8 See Fox v. Paul, 158 Md. 379, 390, 148 Atl. 809 (1929); Fox v. Pierce,
50 Mich. 500, 15 N. W. 880 (1883); Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic City
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establish the route according to the reasonable convenience of both
parties.'
All persons to be affected by the location should be
made parties to the action.'0
Once equity has assumed jurisdiction it is not error for the
chancellor to determine the width of the way. It is within his
sound discretion to determine that which would be a reasonable
width considering the purpose of the deed creating it, the intent
of the parties, and the situation of the property.",
There is not a case precisely in point in West Virginia where
the chancellor has located an easement, but in view of the preceding discussion it seems that a West Virginia court should determine
H. P. S.
its location if the necessity arises.
L.LNDLORD

AND

TENANT

-

COVENANT

TO

REBumaD -

WHN

AccruEs TEREoN. - A lessor brought an action
for damages against his lessee, before the expiration of the term,
based upon the breach of a covenant to replace buildings destroyed
by fire contained in the twenty-year lease. Held, two judges dissenting, that the lessor may maintain such an action before the
term of the lease has expired. Campbell v. KanawTua & Hocking
Coal & Coke Co.'
The history of this question is both interesting and consistent.
At the old common law, a tenant for years was liable for permissive
waste, which included liability for buildings destroyed by fire,
whether or not through the negligence of the tenant.2 The Statute
of Anne, passed in 1707, provided that a tenant would not be liable
for fires which started accidentally.3 Later English and American
cases construed covenants to repair or leave in good condition as
including accidental fires. 4 An English court went as far as to deRIGHT OF ACTION

Electric Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 434, 79 At. 326 (1911). The right to such easement
must be clear or equity will not establish the route, inasmuch as this question
should be settled at law.
0 Stevens v. MacRae, 97 Vt. 76, 122 Atl. S92 (1923).
The report of the com10 Fox v. Paul, 158 Md. 379, 148 At. 809 (1929).
missioner or chancellor is usually final and binding upon the parties and appeal
is usually the only remedy.
1 Addison County v. Blackmer, 101 Vt. 384, 143 Atl. 700 (1928); Palmer
v. Newman, 91 W. Va. 13, 112 S. E. 194 (1922).
'9 S. E. (2d) 135 (W. Va. 1940).
24 KENT'S COMMENTARIS (14th ed. 1896) 89.
36 ANNE a. 31 (1707), 11 STATs. 417, stating ".

. . . no action shall be

against any person in whose house .... any fire shall
.... maintained ....
....
accidentally begin ....
Church Wardens of St. Savior's Southwark v. Smith, 3 Burr. 1271, 97 Eng.
Rep. R. 826 (1762); 1 MznoR, REA'L PnrEaTY (1908) § 416.
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